Beginning in the year 330, the Byzantine
Empire used its well-trained and flexible military to outlast its Western Roman
counterpart by a millennium. The
Byzantines celebrated their highest degree of success between the sixth and
tenth centuries. Their borders reached their peak under the emperor Justinian I.
Justinian began one of the greatest building programs of the Middle Ages,
spreading Byzantine artistic and architectural influences throughout Europe. The
emperor Heraclius defeated the longtime rival of the Byzantines: Sassanian
Persia. But it was the Byzantine army that made all of this possible. The Byzantines left many military manuals for
posterity, which allow us a greater understanding of Byzantine military theory
than nearly any other medieval style of warfare. By using these manuals, as
well as other historical sources which corroborate their use, we can see not
only the changing tactics of the Byzantine army, but also the influences that
shape the Byzantine army.
In the fifth century, the Byzantine army
began to solidify in its general structure, which would last through at least
the eleventh century. Through encounters with the Huns and other nomadic
steppe-cavalrymen, the Byzantines established an army in which the
mounted-archer was the dominant force.[1] By the sixth century, the
mounted archer became the primary arm of the Byzantine military. Sixth century
military manuals such as the Strategikon
and the Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on
Strategy (henceforth Strategy)
describe the Byzantine cavalryman in depth. The Strategikon, attributed to the emperor Maurice at the end of the
sixth century, describes the equipment expected to be carried by a Byzantine
cavalryman:
They should have
hooded coats of mail reaching to their ankles, […] carrying cases; helmets with
small plumes on top; bows suited to the strength of each man […] cases broad
enough that when necessary they can fit the strung bows in them, with spare bow
strings in their saddle bags; quivers with covers holding about thirty or forty
arrows […] cavalry lances of the Avar type, […] swords[2]
describes the Byzantine cavalryman as both a
mobile archer and as a shock-charge soldier: “On horseback at a run he should
fire one or two arrows rapidly and put the strung bow in its case… and then he
should grab the spear which he has been carrying on his back.”[3] Strategy also treats the ideas behind the cavalry formation: “it
too possesses its own kind of forcefulness in attacking, since it does not fall
upon the enemy in a slow or measured way but charges at full speed. This charge
is really terrifying to men who have not had years of combat experience.”[4] What emerges is a picture
of a body of cavalry which would approach their enemy, loose several volleys of
arrows against their opponents, and then charge in on the enemy while they’re
still recovering from the arrow storm. While knights in Western Europe required
support from peasant archers and infantry, the Byzantines developed a system in
which their cavalry could be self-sufficient. However, the Byzantines did not
force their cavalry to do it all.
The Byzantines did train infantry for battle
as well as for garrisoning cities and forts. The basic formation for Byzantine
infantry was the phalanx. This infantry formation was meant to complement the
use of cavalry on the battlefield. While the cavalry became the primary arm of
action for the Byzantines by using their high mobility to strategically
maneuver against the enemy, the infantry became the solid block of the army which
was used to hold ground. Strategy
describes the formation of the phalanx: “A phalanx is a formation of armed men
designed to hold off the enemy. It may assume a variety of shapes: the circle,
the lozenge, the rhomboid, the wedge, the hollow wedge, and many others.”[5] The strength of the phalanx
formation is evident in the Strategikon,
where Maurice describes that the infantry phalanx should be used to protect the
more valuable cavalry formations: “If the army wants to draw up for battle, but
not actually engage in fighting that day, and the enemy charges against our
cavalry… they should not await the charge in their position… but should move in
behind the infantry.”[6] The phalanx formation
often forms the center of the battle-line, and therefore would be expected not
to break. This strength was meant to work in close accordance with the
maneuverability of the Byzantine cavalry. While the infantry could never hope
to be as mobile as the cavalry, there were instructions for different maneuvers
for both branches.
In the sixth century, maneuver had become the
hallmark of the Byzantine military. Strategy
makes the argument that “very few people nowadays have any practical knowledge
of tactics,” and sets out to educate its readers in the fine arts of maneuver.[7] It describes the types of
movement that the phalanx can move: “the regular march, the change of front,
the changing of its own formation, uniting a phalanx which has been split up,
dividing a unified phalanx.”[8] The Strategikon provides the types of maneuvers which would be given for
maneuver on the battlefield. These orders include phrases such as: “give way”;
“turn, threaten”; “to the left/right, change front”; “about face”; and “change
place.” The orders to “give way” and to “turn, threaten” describe orders to
present a false retreat before wheeling about upon your enemies.[9] Changing front to the left
or right is done in response to a threat from that direction, or to swiftly
maneuver to one side or another. It is a maneuver which forces each man in the
formation to turn individually, which means that the formation does not move,
but the front of the formation changes its formation.[10] The orders to “about
face” and “change place” both move the formation around 180 degrees. When the
commander gives the order to “about face,” each man pivots in place, while the
order to “change place” causes the whole formation to turn by marching out.[11] Maurice also describes to
us the need to use surprise attacks and maneuvers, especially when the
Byzantines were outnumbered: “it is better… to try to employ different
surprises and tricks as much as possible rather than engage in a pitched battle
which involves dangers which could prove fatal.”[12] This becomes a common
sentiment in the Strategikon and
Maurice continually stresses the importance of maneuver and flexible
formations.
Maurice writes in Greek, the common language
of the Byzantine Empire, but most of the orders listed in the Strategikon are listed in Latin. This is
evidence that despite the major shift away from the Roman style of fighting
(legionary infantry acting as the primary military arm), the Byzantines cling
to their Roman military heritage by preserving
their military language. The order to “Give way. Turn. Threaten”
translates from the Latin “Cede. Torna
mina.”[13]
The order to march in line comes from the Latin “Equaliter ambula.”[14] The Byzantines also mimic
their Roman ancestors by making use of a large officer corps. Besides the
general and his personal staff, there are merarchs (also called stratelates and
includes the lieutenant general) who command the largest formations, the meros.
Beneath the merarchs are the moirarchs (also called dukes or chiliarchs) who
command detachments of two-to-three thousand men. Below the moirarchs are the
counts (also called tribunes) which oversee the individual formations which are
called tagmas or bandons and which consist of three-to-four hundred men. Within
each tagma are the hekatontarchs, ilarchs, dekarchs, pentarchs, tetrarchs, file
guards, heralds, and standard bearers.[15] This extended officer
corps is a strict meritocracy and is very reminiscent of the Roman obsession
with organization. We have seen the influence of Roman military heritage on the
military manuals of the sixth century.
These manuals were not simply written as practices
in military theory. They were put to use on the battlefields and off, and the
evidence is quite clear. The general Belisarius, after his victories against
the Vandals, returned to Constantinople and was celebrated in a traditional
triumph. This traditional celebration, according to Procopius, had not been
celebrated since the emperors Titus and Trajan.[16] Belisarius, during his
defense of Rome against the Ostrogoths, utilized his cavalry in an unusual way.
He sent two hundred soldiers under a commander named Trajan to attack an
Ostrogothic camp. The cavalry detachment moved to a hilltop and enticed the
Goths to leave their camp. The Goths moved out against this small force and the
Byzantines began successfully showering arrows upon their enemies: “And since
their shafts fell among a dense throng, they were for the most part successful
in hitting a man or a horse. But when all their missiles had at last failed
them, they rode off to the rear with all speed.”[17] The Goths chased the
Byzantine cavalry back to the walls of Rome, where the defenders upon the walls
began firing upon them with bows and siege engines. The Goths suffered nearly one thousand
casualties because they couldn’t match the mobility and versatility of the
Byzantine cavalry.[18] Another example of using
the Byzantine maneuverability to surprise and defeat an opponent came under the
leadership of the emperor Heraclius. When the Persians failed to surprise
Heraclius with an attack at dawn, Heraclius ordered his men to execute a false
retreat. The Persians pursued and broke ranks. Then, the Byzantines wheeled
about and decimated their Persian enemies.[19] This is not just an
example of Maurice’s maxim of using surprises and tricks, but also an example
of the orders to “Give way” and then “Turn, threaten.”
By the ninth and tenth centuries, the
Byzantines had seen an explosion in the writing of military manuals. Sources
such as the Anonymous Book on Tactics,
the Taktika by the general Nicephorus
Ouranos, and the Praeceptra militaria
and Skirmishing, both possibly by the
emperor Nicephorus II Phocas, all combine to show the depth and breadth of
Byzantine military theory. The Praecepta
militaria lists several distinctions of cavalry. In addition to basic
mounted archers, the Praecepta lists
light cavalry (called prokoursatores)
and heavy cavalry (kataphraktoi). The
prokoursatores would be used as
scouts before battle, and during battle would be used to “stir up” an enemy
which is hesitant to engage.[20] The heavily-armed and
armored kataphraktoi would be formed
into a large wedge and used in a classic cavalry shock-charge:
“The triangular formation of kataphraktoi must then carry on at its
pace and its front line must strike against the commander of the enemy
formation… the enemy will be put to flight… they will smash the heads and
bodies of the enemy and their horses with their iron maces and sabers, they
will break into and dismember their formations, and from there break through
them and so completely destroy them.”[21]
This is likely an influence from Byzantine
interactions with Western Europeans, who stereotypically over-relied on the
heavy-cavalry shock-charge. This shows the continued shaping of the Byzantine
military by foreign sources. This shows a definite shift from the concept of a
highly versatile cavalry corps to a more specialized variety of cavalry types.
These new cavalry variations could not possibly match their sixth-century
counterparts for their wide range of skills, but could likely be more effective
in their individual uses. If the three types of tenth-century cavalry could
coordinate their actions effectively, they could prove to be much more
devastating. This type of coordination required even more precision and training
than it did in the sixth century. This demonstrates a major change in the
Byzantine military.
Through these examples we see not only the
changing tactics of the Byzantine army, but also the influences that shape the
Byzantine army. The sixth century manuals clearly demonstrate the importance of
a flexible, versatile core of cavalry which work in conjunction with infantry
to out maneuver their enemies. The tenth century manuals stress the importance
of a variety of highly specialized cavalry. And we have seen aspects of these
manuals enacted in the historical record. The Byzantine military, through its
flexibility and effectiveness, helped the Byzantine Empire last one thousand
years.
~Written by Shelby Harris
~Written by Shelby Harris
[1] Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, 56.
[2] Maurice, Strategikon, trans. George T. Dennis in Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine
Military Strategy, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 12.
[3] Maurice, 11.
[4] Anonymous, “The
Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy,” in Three Byzantine Military Treatises, Translated and edited by George
T. Dennis, 9-136, (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and
Collection, 1985), 59.
[5] Strategy, 47.
[6] Maurice, 144.
[7] Strategy, 47.
[8] Strategy, 59.
[9] Maurice, 39.
[10] Maurice, 39.
[11] Maurice, 39.
[12] Maurice, 93.
[13] Maurice, 39.
[14] Maurice, 38.
[15] Maurice, 16-17.
[16] Procopius, History of the Wars, Books I and II: The
Persian Wars, translated by H.B. Dewing, LaVergne, TN: Dodo Press, 2010,
106.
[17] Procopius, History of the Wars, Books V and VI: The
Gothic War, translated by H.B. Dewing, LaVergne, TN: Dodo Press, 2010, 97.
[18] Procopius, The Gothic War, 97.
[19] Theophanes,
“Chronographia,” trans. Harry Turtledove in The
Chronicle of Theophanes, Anni mundi 6095-6305 (A.D. 602-813),
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 15.
[20] Nicephorus II Phocas,
Praecepta militaria, in Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare
in the Tenth Century, trans. and edited by Eric McGeer, 12-60, (Washington,
D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995) 27.
[21] Nicephorus Ouranos, Taktika, in Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century,
trans. and edited by Eric McGeer, 88-164, (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks
Research Library and Collection, 1995) 129.
